Central banks typically control an overnight interest rate as their policy tool, and the transmission of monetary policy happens through the relationship of this overnight rate to the rest of the yield curve. The expectations hypothesis, that longer-term rates should equal expected future short-term rates plus a term premium, provides the typical framework for understanding this relationship. We explore the effect of volatility in the federal funds market on the expectations hypothesis in money markets. We present two major results. First, the expectations hypothesis is likely to be rejected in money markets if the realized federal funds rate is studied instead of an appropriate measure of the expected federal funds rate. Second, we find that lower volatility in the funds market, all else equal, leads to a lower term premium and thus longer-term rates for a given setting of the overnight rate. The results have implications for the design of operational frameworks for the implementation of monetary policy and for the interpretation of the changes in the Libor-OIS spread during the financial crisis. We also demonstrate that the expectations hypothesis is more likely to hold the more closely linked the short-and long-term interest rates are.
Introduction
Central banks typically control an overnight interest rate as their policy tool, and most economists think that the transmission of monetary policy happens through the relationship of this overnight rate to the rest of the yield curve. The expectations hypothesis, that longerterm rates should equal expected future short-term rates plus a term premium, provides the typical framework for understanding this relationship. The degree of control that the Federal Reserve has exercised over the funds rate has not been constant through time, and the current financial crisis has led to dislocations in many money markets. We explore the effect that volatility in the federal funds market has on the expectations hypothesis in money markets.
Specifically, we look for evidence that volatility in the overnight rate can affect the term premium embedded in longer-term rates.
The Federal Reserve has had a target for the federal funds rate for decades. Although from 1979 to 1982, the path of nonborrowed reserves was the official operating framework, both before and after, the Federal Open Market Committee had an intended level for the funds rate (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992 , Rudebusch, 1995 , Meulendyke, 1998 . The volatility in the funds market, however, has not been constant (see Bennett and Peristiani, 2002; Hilton, 2005; Demiralp and Farley, 2005, Nautz and Schmidt, 2009 ). Demiralp and Farley have documented the decline in volatility in the funds market during the 1990s, for example, and attribute the trend to higher frequency of open market operations on the part of the Federal Reserve, improved reserve management of banks, and consolidations in the banking system. Nautz and Schmidt (2009) note that the steps taken towards transparency since 1994 further stabilized the funds rate volatility. As monetary policy in the United
States has become more transparent and predictable, the anticipation of changes to the target rate led to movements in the funds rate before many target rate changes. Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) investigate this phenomenon and document that there is some evidence that the anticipation effect is transmitted to the very near end of the yield curve. In this paper, we try to estimate what effect more generalized volatility in the federal funds rate has on longerterm money market rates.
The expectations hypothesis has been studied extensively in the economics literature.
Among the more notable examples are Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz, 1983 , Campbell and Schiller, 1991 , Mankiw and Miron, 1986 , and Rudebusch, 1995 . The literature provides mixed support for the expectations hypothesis in its most simple form, however, with the allowance for (potentially time-varying) term premiums, the record improves. For the short end of the yield curve, Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) , as an example, provide evidence that the link between expected future short rates and longer-term rates has become stronger with more transparent and predictable monetary policy.
Many researchers who have tested the expectations hypothesis, however, have found very weak evidence at the short end of the yield curve. Mankiw and Miron (1986) attributed the negligible predictive power of the spread between long rates and short rates to the Federal Reserve's interest smoothing policies. They argued that the Federal Reserve's interest stabilization policies induced a random walk behavior at the short end of the yield curve.
Under these circumstances and assuming rational expectations, the short rate expected by the market would always equal the current short rate, and the term spread would always equal the term premium. Fluctuations in the spread would have no predictive power for the path of the short rate. Mankiw and Miron's argument is that the Fed's interest rate smoothing weakens the term structure relationship by preventing any information about the near-term expectations to be reflected in short term rates. In this paper, we note that the performance of the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve improves when an appropriate measure of the expected federal funds rate is used.
Using data from 1992 through 2009, we find that lower volatility in the funds market leads, all else equal, to a lower term premium and thus lower longer-term rates for a given setting of the overnight rate. The result is fairly intuitive. One reason for the expectations hypothesis to hold is through arbitrage. If the term rate was expected to be above the expected overnight rate, a bank could borrow at the overnight rate to fund a term loan and earn the spread. Volatility in the overnight rate, however, creates uncertainty in funding costs. If this uncertainty leads potential arbitrageurs to demand a risk premium for funding a term loan through overnight funds, the term premium should rise.
These results bear on the design of the framework for the implementation of monetary policy with regard to the desirable degree of control over the overnight rate. For example, while a simple framework may be desirable from an operational perspective, if a simple framework were to lead to an overnight rate that is is volatile, term premiums, and therefore longer-term rates, would likely be higher. The results also suggest a different, or perhaps additional, interpretation of the changes in the Libor-OIS spread during the financial crisis.
Researchers who studied the crisis have looked for a link between the Libor-OIS spread and counterparty risk, often measure by credit-default-swap (CDS) spreads (see for example, Taylor and Williams, 2009, McAndrews et al., 2009) . Additionally, researches have attributed narrowing in the spread to the Federal Reserve's liquidity provision through various facilities (see McAndrews et al., 2009 , Christensen et al., 2009 . Our results suggest an alternative, but easily complementary, channel for the narrowing of the spread. Figure 1 plots the three-month Libor-OIS spread together with average intraday volatility over the previous 30 days, along with the median CDS spread for the banks in the Libor panel from 
The Expectations Hypothesis
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates states that current longer-term rates should equal to the average of the expected overnight rate plus some term premium that accounts for liquidity risk, credit risk, or other factors. In practice, we could think of the three-month Treasury bill rate (TB3) as the long-term rate and the overnight federal funds rate (FFR) to be the short-term rate. We could write the expectations hypothesis as follows:
(1)
Where t E denotes the expectations operator at time t and c is a term premium. In many empirical tests of the term structure such as Campbell and Schiller (1991) , Mankiw and Miron (1986), and Roberds et al. (1996) , a common practice is to assume "perfect foresight" 
In equation (2), the term premium drops due to differencing, under the assumption that it changes only a negligible amount from one day to another, which is an even weaker assumption than a constant term premium throughout the maturity of the long-term contract.
This specification is particularly convenient for our purposes because it allows us to investigate the importance of imposing the perfect foresight assumption and its implications in testing the expectations hypothesis without worrying about the term premium.
The first column in Table 1 shows the results from the regresson where changes in the three-month rate are regressed onto changes in the realized funds rate over the next 90 days, as is typically assumed in the literature. The sample period extends from January 1, 1990
through June 30, 2009. Note that the slope coefficient is significantly different from its theoretical value of one and the 2 R is very low. Instead, the second column shows the regression results where the change in the three-month rate is regressed onto the expected changes in the funds rate over the next 90 days. This time, the coefficient estimate is 2 More specifically, the tests check whether the spread between today's 90-day Treasury rate and the funds rate help explain the spread between the average funds rate over the next 90 days and today's funds rate.
insignificantly different from its theoretical value of one. Furthermore, the 2 R of the regression increases noticeably.
The second and third columns in Table 1 show the results from a similar exercise with changes in six-month Treasury yield regressed onto the change in the average funds rate in the next six months and the change in the average expected funds rate in the next six months.
The results are similar to the results for the three-month bill rate. When the expected funds rate is used instead of the realized funds rate, the coefficient estimate equals its theoretical value of one and 2 R increases substantially.
Market expectations of the funds rate over the future months can also be derived from the overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate. Overnight indexed swaps are over-the-counter traded derivatives in which one party agrees to pay a fixed rate in exchange for the average of a floating central-bank rate over the life of the swap. For dollar swaps, the floating rate is the daily effective federal funds rate. The OIS rate is a measure of market participants' expected average federal funds rate over the relevant term. One drawback, however, is that data on overnight-indexed swaps were not available prior to December 2001 because the market was still developing. Table 2 illustrates how the results based on federal funds futures contracts compare to those based on OIS rates. The first column in Table 2 replicates the first column Table 1 for a more recent sample after December 2001 where the three-month Treasury bill rate is regressed onto the average funds rate over the next 90 days. The coefficient estimate is comparable to the one obtained for the longer sample and is significantly smaller than one.
The second and third columns replace the average funds rate with the expected funds rate based on federal funds futures contracts and three-month OIS rate respectively. In both cases, the coefficient estimate associated with the expected funds rate is insignificantly different from its theoretical value of one. The close resemblance between the results using either expectations measure is consistent with the discussion in the Appendix regarding the close match between the two expectations measures.
Term premiums and bank funding rates
The results presented in the previous section suggest that estimation of the expectations hypothesis at the near end of the yield curve is sensitive to the use of realized rates versus market-based expectations of future short rates. Using measures of expectations yields results where the expectations hypothesis appears to hold at the short end of the yield curve. We now turn to studying the term premium and analyze its behavior during the current crisis.
The estimation in the previous section was done in changes, following much of the literature, to avoid potential issues of nonstationarity with the interest rates and to avoid the term premium. The level of rates, or more precisely, the level of the term rate relative to the expected overnight rate, however, may also be of interest. Term spreads are typically thought to capture risk premiums, and estimating term-structure relationships from spreads are a way to avoid stationarity problems. That said, in the simplest form, using a term spread as the dependent variable and estimating the effect of other variables on that spread essentially imposes the expectations hypothesis on the data. Estimating the relationship in levels to be able to test the hypothesis is valid if residuals from the regression are stationary, implying that there is a cointegrating relationship in the nonstationary variables. Furthermore, estimating the regression in levels allows us to quantify the components of this term premium and better understand the reasons behind interest rate fluctuations during the recent financial turmoil.
While the results of the previous section appear to be supportive of the expectations hypothesis, the comparison of the federal funds rate-an unsecured, bank funding rate-to the Treasury bill rate-a riskless, government funding rate-may be a bit problematic once we consider the variables in levels. Spreads between these rates will likely reflect risk premiums that we would expect, but because the instruments are inherently different and the markets have different participants, the comparison is not direct. To make a more direct comparison, we use different bank funding rates, three-month Libor, three month Eurodollar, and three-month federal funds to test the expectations hypothesis. We run the same estimation using the three-month Treasury bill rate as a comparison. In the level regressions, the dependent variable is one of the term rates. According to the expectations hypothesis, the term rate should equal expected short rate over the maturity of the term rate and a term premium. In order to capture the expectations component we use the OIS rate or the expected funds rate derived from federal funds futures contracts as an independent variable.
In this simple specification, the residuals are non-stationary, suggesting that the cointegrating relationship, if it exists, has not been captured.. Adding a measure of federal funds volatility to capture part of the term premium, we obtain a co-integrating relationship that gives stationary residuals. To compare the results to other research, we also include a measure of credit risk, although the latter alone is not sufficient to generate stationary errors in the absence of a measure for federal funds volatility. Table 3 presents the results of level regressions. Here, we start our sample period in January 2003 to be able to use an index of CDS spreads for large banks as a measure of credit risk. Importantly, this sample includes relatively calm periods in the bank funding market as well as some rather turbulent episodes. In the upper panel (panel A), we regress the level of the term rate on a constant, comparable maturity OIS rate, the realized volatility of the federal funds rate, and the index of CDS spread for large banks. The last two terms are intended to capture the term premium. Volatility in the federal funds market can be measured in different ways. In these results, we show the results from using the average intraday volatility over the preceding 30 days as a proxy for expected volatility in the near future. However, the results are robust to using other measures of funds rate volatility, such as realized daily standard deviation of the federal funds rate or the mean absolute deviation of the funds rate from the target over the prior 30 days (not shown). If the expectations hypothesis were to hold perfectly, the constant term would equal a time-invariant term premium and the slope on the OIS rate would equal one.
Column 1 in the upper panel of Table 3 shows that for three-month Libor, there is a 16 basis point term premium and a coefficient on the OIS rate that is very close to one. 3 The coefficient, however, is rather precisely measured and is statistically significantly different from one. The CDS spread index has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, confirming the results in other research that, conditional on a given level of the expected path for the funds rate, greater credit risk among banks is associated with a wider term premium.
Volatility in the federal funds market is also statistically significant and associated with a wider term premium. Finally, the R-squared of the regression is very high. One might suspect that the regression is subject to spurious correlation, given the fact that interest rates are typically found to be nonstationary. However, the stationarity of the residuals, and thus the presence of the cointegrating relationship, implies that the regression is valid and the coefficients are estimated consistently..
What does the first column of results tell us? Essentially, the slope coefficient suggests that the expectations hypothesis basically holds for bank funding markets from the overnight rate to the three-month rate. Figure 2 plots the Libor-OIS spread, the fitted value from our regression, and the spread that our model suggests is attributable to federal funds volatility. Of note, following year end 2008, volatility in the federal funds rate declined notably and the Libor-OIS spread narrowed even more. To be sure, general market conditions improved, however, the ability of a bank that might be inclined to arbitrage term markets was clearly enhanced by greater certainty over the path of the funds rate.
Columns 2 and 3 provide robustness checks and present a similar picture for the threemonth Eurodollar rate and the three-month federal funds rate. Qualitatively, the results are virtually identical. The slope coefficient is close to one, credit market risk is a significant explanatory variable, and volatility in the overnight market is statistically significant.
The picture is a bit different when the term rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate.
The coefficients on CDS spreads and on federal funds rate volatility are both statistically significant, but negative. These results, however, are intuitive. The Treasury bill is a riskfree instrument and, more importantly, a safe-haven asset. When markets experience elevated risk or volatility, demand for the safest assets increases, driving down the yield on Treasury bills. The fact that the coefficients are of opposite signs, however, underscores the advantages of comparing like types of funding rates.
As an additional robustness check, we repeat the analysis by replacing the OIS rate with the measure of the expected funds rate that is derived from federal funds futures contracts. As shown in the lower panel of only provide a robustness check for our results, they also allow us to extend our sample period. In Table 4 , we repeat the analysis in Table 3 Table 3 . The coefficient estimates associated with the Libor-Tibor spread are significantly larger than those associated with the CDS spread and the difference is statistically significant. Table 6 . We note that although the interest rate volatility is highly significant for all different interest rates, the CDS rate is only significant for the Libor and Treasury bill rates.
The main focus in Taylor and Williams (2009) Table 7 shows the results from the specification using this dummy variable. As shown, the TAF dummy is negative and highly significant for all term rates except for the rate on the three-month Treasury bill. While we do not take a stand on the interpretation of these types of analyses, our main results are robust to the inclusion of these measures. We conclude that, however effective the TAF was in narrowing spreads and lowering rates, the role of volatility in the funds market also needs to be considered.
Further robustness checks, we consider adding a dummy variable to control for volatility on quarter-ends (McAndrews et al., 2009 ) which turns out to be insignificant. The results are qualitatively unchanged when we consider a GARCH specification as well (not shown).
Conclusions
The results presented above have a variety of implications. First, the results provide another set of evidence that the expectations hypothesis is generally a valid characterization of the term structure of interest rates, at least at the very near end of the yield curve. In terms of levels, a higher degree of volatility in the overnight rate is associated with a greater term premium. That is to say, greater volatility leads to a higher longer-term rate for a given level of the short rate. If one mechanism through which the expectations hypothesis holds is intertemporal arbitrage, lenders lending long while funding themselves short, volatility in the short rate increases the risk associated with this trade, making the lender demand a higher term premium.
The implications of these findings are varied. Failure to find empirical support for the expectations hypothesis could reflect mismeasurement of expectations, not simply a refutation of the hypothesis. Our results confirm that using measures of the expected federal funds rate instead of the realized federal funds rate yields results that tend to support the expectations hypothesis. Second, in the current financial crisis, a great deal of attention has been paid to the Libor-OIS spread. The popular view is that this spread reflects liquidity and term premiums in the bank funding market, and thus the spread can be used as a summary statistic for those strains. Those effects are surely present, however these results suggest also considering the volatility in the overnight rate when interpreting that spread. Essentially, the higher volatility adds to the liquidity risk that exists in the market. Finally, the Federal
Reserve has changed its operating procedure for the daily implementation of monetary policy. The high level of reserve balances in the banking system has led to a discussion of various tools at the central bank's disposal for its "exit strategy" from its current accomodative stance. If those tools lead to an operating framework where the overnight rate is more volatile than it had been, even conditional on being able to hit a target rate on avearge, then the results presented above suggest that term premiums should be higher and, all else equal, longer-term interest rates will be higher conditional on a given setting of the overnight rate. is the expected funds rate calculated from federal fund futures contracts over the maturity of the security (which is 90-days for all the securities considered in this table).
Tibor data is available after 1996, which determines the beginning of the sample size in panel B. is the expected funds rate calculated from federal fund futures contracts over the maturity of the security (which is 90-days for all the securities considered in this table).
Repo data is available after 1992, which determines the beginning of the sample size in panel B. We now describe how we calculate each of these components A through D. 
